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Abstract
Scholars have extensively detailed China’s conflation of the Uyghur issue in Xinjiang with the international war on
terror following September 11, 2001. Less studied is how the U.S. responded to China’s framing of the Uyghur as
terrorists, and of the Chinese government’s characterization of Xinjiang as a region fraught with violence and
extremism. On the whole, scholars who have addressed this latter issue conclude that China successfully coopted the
U.S., and consequently cracked down on Xinjiang without substantial international outrage. On the basis of a review
of official U.S. documents before and after 9/11, I argue that the U.S. response to China’s framing of the Uyghur is
not as clear-cut, and that multiple and conflicting U.S. responses emerged to the Uyghur-terrorist discourse.
Specifically, the U.S. shifted from purely framing the Uyghur as victims of human rights abuses to projecting three
new frames onto the Uyghur: victims of the war on terror; a minority group that may resort to violent methods of
protest; and suspected terrorists. This new interpretation holds important ramifications for how scholars should
understand China’s treatment of the Uyghur, as well as for Sino-U.S. relations.
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Introduction
On July 5th, 2009, a riot1 in China directed the attention of the international community towards
a previously obscure area and people group: the Uyghur.2 The riot, which was originally a
peaceful protest, took place in Ürümqi, the capital of Xinjiang, and left more than 1,700 injured
and 197 dead, involving thousands of rioters—most of whom were ethnic Uyghur—in a country
notorious for harsh repression and no civil right to protest.3 Indeed, such a public demonstration
of similar size had not been seen in Communist China since protesters advocated for democracy
at Tiananmen in 1989.

1

Though the 2009 Ürümqi incident began as a peaceful protest, this event is referred to here as a riot because the
demonstration escalated into a violent conflict between the Han, Uyghur, and Chinese police. Also, in major news
sources like Xinhua and The New York Times, this event is referred to as a riot. Edward Wong, “Riots in Western
China Amid Ethnic Tension,” New York Times, July 5, 2009, accessed December 12, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/06/world/asia/06china.html.
2
Although this ethnic group is referred to as both the Uyghur and the Uighur, this paper uses the prior spelling
because major Uyghur organizations like the Uyghur American Association and World Uyghur Congress refer to
themselves as the Uyghur.
3
Yufan Hao and Weihua Liu. “Xinjiang: Increasing Pain in the Heart of China’s Borderland.” Journal of
Contemporary China 21.74 (2012): 205, accessed October 5, 2015, doi:10.1080/10670564.2012.635927.
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Despite a series of incidents in Xinjiang stemming from years of repressive policies and
growing Uyghur ethnic identity, it was not until the 2009 Ürümqi riots that the Uyghur became
the public locus of China’s ethnic tension. Like the Tiananmen protests, the struggle in Xinjiang
brought to light domestic turmoil in China. Also, this incident similarly sparked calls for more
democracy and human rights in China as well as accusations of government cruelty reminiscent
of Tiananmen. However, while the Tiananmen protests called for political reform and
modernization modeled on the democratic West, the Ürümqi riots primarily revolved around
frustration over discrimination, ethnic tension, and lack of religious freedom. Furthermore,
Tiananmen involved students and workers, and took place during China’s economic emergence
in Beijing—one of China’s most modern cities; whereas the Ürümqi riots involved the Uyghur—
a politically underrepresented and economically disadvantaged ethnic group—in the relatively
undeveloped region of Xinjiang. Another key distinction that can be drawn between Tiananmen
and Ürümqi is how the protesters and rioters were framed: in Tiananmen, those involved were
called supporters of “bourgeois liberalism.”4 In Ürümqi, the Uyghur were framed as “separatists”
“extremists,” and even suspected as “terrorists.”5 This choice to connect unrest in Xinjiang with
terrorism is largely due to geopolitical factors: Xinjiang has been an indispensable geopolitical
and economic asset to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since its integration into mainland
China, but it now represents a serious domestic and international challenge. Yufan Hao and
Weihua Liu expressed this well when they wrote that the “Xinjiang issue involves China’s core

4

Encyclopedia Britannica Online, s.v. “Tiananmen Square Incident,” accessed December 2, 2015,
http://www.britannica.com/event/Tiananmen-Square-incident.
5
Thomas Cliff, “The Partnership of Stability in Xinjiang: State-Society Interactions Following the July 2009
Unrest,” China Journal 68 (2012): 80, accessed December 2, 2015, ISSN: 1234-9347.
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interests and the most serious challenge Beijing faces is how to cope with ethnic tension in a
highly sensitive region bordered by politically unstable countries like Afghanistan.”6
The significance of Xinjiang has led many scholars to analyze the various underlying
causes of the ethnic tension behind the Urumqi riots, and to examine how the Chinese
government has sought to manage this tension through education, social programs, and economic
incentives. Since 9/11, scholars have focused attention on whether and how the U.S. sponsored
“war on terror” has influenced China to associate the Uyghur Muslim population with global
terrorism. Many scholars, specialists, and officials in the U.S. argue that China’s “cooperation”
in the war on terror has functioned as a thinly-veiled excuse to pursue political ends unrelated to
halting terrorism. This body of scholarship has led to special attention directed at the Uyghur in
Xinjiang, and the tracing of China’s quick inclination to blame violence in Xinjiang on Muslim
Uyghur terrorists back to 9/11. Read in this light, the Uyghur uprising is the beginning of
China’s effort to portray cracking down on Xinjiang as simply part of the global war on terror.
For these scholars, it is not surprising that in the immediate aftermath of the Ürümqi riots,
China’s major newspaper Xinhua speculated that terrorism was involved and placed the Uyghur
at the top of the list of terror suspects:
“As the casualties rise from the July 5 riot in Ürümqi . . . experts have warned that terrorism might be the
real driving force behind the violence. Terrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna said in a telephone interview
with Xinhua on Friday that the World Uyghur Congress (WUC), which China alleges instigated the riot, is
closely associated with the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a separatist group that has been
labeled by the U.N. Security Council as well as the Chinese and U.S. governments a terrorist
organization.”7

Scholars have extensively examined how official Chinese statements like this one
demonstrate the government’s intent to co-opt the U.S. war on terror for its own political ends.

6

Ibid.
Yan Hao, Ruibin Geng and Yuan Ye, “Xinjiang Riot Hits Regional Anti-terror Nerve,” Xinhua, June 18, 2009.
Accessed September 28, 2015. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-07/18/content_11727782.htm.
7
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This paper goes further by analyzing how this leveraging also impacts the U.S. discourse
surrounding the Uyghur. In order to thoroughly explore and explain this issue, this paper does
the following: examine the various ways the scholarly community explains the CCP’s treatment
of the Uyghur issue in Xinjiang; discuss China’s leveraging of the war on terror to justify its
crackdown on Xinjiang; and evaluate official U.S. statements and the developing public
discourse they represent. Ultimately, this research leads to a new interpretation of how 9/11
changed the situation for the Uyghur, even thousands of miles away in the U.S. Though prior to
9/11, in U.S. official documents, the Uyghur were either unacknowledged or framed as victims
of human rights abuses, following the advent of the international war on terror and the antiMuslim discourse it created, the Uyghur’s identity in U.S. politics became more prominent and
necessarily multifaceted: the Uyghur became no longer just human rights victims, but also
victims of the war on terror, and contradictorily, possible terrorists themselves. Overall, this new
framing reveals that in response to China’s portrayal of Xinjiang as the locus of its war on terror,
U.S. framing of the Uyghur is no longer binary, but diverse and complex.

Xinjiang: a catch-22 situation 进退维谷的情况
To fully understand the situation in Xinjiang, it is important to first grasp the history and
significance of this region: The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous, abbreviated to XUAR and
written as 新疆自治区 in Chinese, is located in China’s extreme northwest, and is the country’s
largest province. Although most people view China as ethnically and culturally homogenous,
Xinjiang is multi-ethnic, with the Uyghur, or 维吾尔族, constituting only a slim majority of the
population (9.832 million in Xinjiang) over the Han (8.363 million), who make up the
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overwhelming majority of China’s population at 91 percent.8 This region has a tumultuous
history, and conflict between groups vying for power in Xinjiang is not a recent development.
Indeed, Xinjiang experienced multiple periods of domination by local warlords in the intervals
between the collapse of one Chinese dynasty, and the consolidation of power in the next. This
fluctuation between eras of external rule by Chinese empires and internal domination by
warlords ended in 1949 with the entrance of the People’s Liberation Army into Xinjiang.
However the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region was not formally established until 1955.9
China’s history of losing and regaining its foothold in Xinjiang is connected with the
region’s politically valuable geographical location. As Figure 1 shows, China borders eight
separate countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrghizstan, Tajikistan, Russia, the Republic of Mongolia,
India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

8

Linda T.H. Tsung and Ken Cruickshank, “Mother Tongue and Bilingual Minority Education in Xinjiang.”
International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism 12.5 (2009): 551, accessed September 28, 2015, doi:
10.1080/13670050802153434.
9
Hao and Liu, “Xinjiang: Increasing Pain,” 206-207.
Figure 1: Wannabe Polyglot, “Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,” accessed November 13, 2015,
https://ibbeijinger.wordpress.com/2013/05/23/xinjiang-uyghur-autonomous-region/.
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Geopolitically, Xinjiang is of vital importance to China, which is completely landlocked along
its western borders. Furthermore, Xinjiang serves as a buffer between conflict in the Middle East
and Mainland China, although this tension historically spills over into Xinjiang, especially from
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Therefore, Xinjiang is considered virtually a cultural-political fault
line and an area of instability and confrontation between the Middle East and Asia.
Besides its geopolitical significance, Xinjiang holds economic significance for China. As
one-sixth of China’s landmass, the region houses immense natural resources and potential for
economic development. In addition to being the passageway of the new Eurasian continental
bridge, Xinjiang is the most important energy base in China, and contains 115 of the 147 raw
materials found in the entire country.10 Furthermore, if Xinjiang were to become independent,
Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and other regions with strong ethnic identities, could quite possibly
follow, and China would lose more than half it’s territory and critical resources—a blow which
would severely set the Chinese economy on a downward course. Nevertheless, the chance of
losing Xinjiang always existed, as ethnic tension, primarily between the Uyghur and Han
peoples, threatens to destabilize the region. This increasing tension is largely due to the
increasing Han population in Xinjiang province—a purposeful policy decision on the part of the
CCP to dilute the Uyghur population and thereby diffuse ethnic conflict.11 However, contrary to
expectations, this strategy of ethnic dilution has had the opposite effect, as it is reported
“attitudes of racial and cultural superiority have become commonplace as the Han population in
Xinjiang grows.”12

10

Hao and Liu, “Xinjiang: Increasing Pain,” 211.
Barry Sautman,“Paved with Good Intentions: Proposals to Curb Minority Rights and Their Consequences for
China,” Modern China 38.1(2012): 11, accessed November 14, 2015, doi: 10.1177/0097700411424563.
12
Zang Xiaowei, “Uyghur-Han Earning Differentials in Urumchi.” The China Journal 65 (2011): 144, accessed
October 10, 2015, doi:10.2307/25790561.
11
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Historically, the Han and Uyghur have a long history of ethnic tension which persists
today. Much of this tension comes from discrimination against the Uyghur’s culture and beliefs,
which distances this religious minority more than others from the generally nonreligious Han
majority. Culturally, the Uyghur are viewed as barbaric and inferior, and therefore face bias in
society as a whole, especially in the workplace.13 On the other hand, many Han people believe
that the Uyghur receive unjust preferential treatment due to the government’s affirmative action
policies—driving another wedge between these two groups.14 Moreover, the Uyghur feel
removed from both political and economic development in Xinjiang due to a lack of political
participation and economic involvement.15 Driven by a sense of unjust deprivation combined
with a weak affiliation to local elite, many Uyghur have developed a strong tendency toward
separatist nationalism, and therefore do not identify with China as a whole. Since the most
important goal of the CCP is to “maintain stability,” or 保持稳定, there is little if any distinction
drawn between separatism and terrorism in China’s policies toward the Uyghur.16
Lack of Uyghur integration into Chinese society has also led to the creation of multiple
international Uyghur advocacy groups, the most prominent of which are the World Uyghur
Congress (WUC), the World Uyghur Youth Congress (WUYC), and the Uyghur American
Association (UAA). While these organizations are widely regarded as peaceful human rights
groups outside of China, several more controversial groups also exist, including the East
Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO) and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM).17

13

Hao and Liu, “Xinjiang: Increasing Pain,” 218.
Sautman,“Paved with Good Intentions,” 17.
15
Ibid., 214.
16
Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, “Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China,” Asian Affairs: An American
Review 35.1 (2008): 16-17, accessed October 15, 2015, doi: 10.3200/AAFS.35.1.15-30.
17
Ibid., 208.
14
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The war on terror had significant consequences for these groups: since 9/11, China has insisted
that all are dangerous, and that some are even terrorist organizations.
However, leveraging the war on terror in its Uyghur framing accounts for only one
method employed by China to control and crackdown on this problematic region without
invoking international involvement or even excessive criticism. Scholars on the Uyghur issue
have extensively detailed how China attempts to deal with ethnic tension and separatism in the
region since there is perhaps no issue about which China is more sensitive than its control of
Xinjiang.18

Discrimination, religion, and politics
As previously discussed, the CCP’s political legitimacy rests on its ability to maintain stability
nationwide—an ability that is threatened by ethnic tension in Xinjiang. Scholars identify several
ways in which China has sought to address this ethnic tension: through anti-discrimination laws,
preferential treatment policies, and decreasing the size of the Uyghur population through
dilution. In the scholarly community, it is widely accepted that the Uyghur in Xinjiang face
rampant discrimination in politics, the marketplace, and everyday life.19 This discrimination
greatly contributes to ethnic tension between the Han and Uyghur, so the Chinese government
enacted anti-discrimination laws in Xinjiang in hopes of decreasing the economic and social
divide between these two groups.20 However, these laws are not effective, as they lack sincere
enforcement.21 Another way that the government attempts to increase stability and decrease the

18

Zang, Xiaowei, “Uyghur-Han Earning,” 141.
Ibid., 143.
20
Ronald Brown, Understanding Labor and Employment Law in China, (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2010), 83-86.
21
Sautman,“Paved with Good Intentions,” 15-16.
19
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Han-Uyghur divide in the region is through preferential treatment policies. Still, some scholars
argue that Uyghur favoritism actually exacerbates ethnic tension, because many Han Chinese see
Uyghur as undeserving of special treatment, and accuse the government of reverse
discrimination.22 Indeed, scholars Ma Rong, Wang Lixiong, and Wang Yinggou argue that the
government should depoliticize ethnicity, because race-based policies potentially create barriers
to integration.23 China scholar Thomas Cliff notes: Chinese policy-makers assume there is a
“positive correlation between a high Han population and socio–political stability in Xinjiang.”24
Indeed, other methods employed by the Chinese government include diluting the Uyghur
ethnicity through a controversial policy of cash incentives for interracial marriage between the
Uyghur and Han, and flooding the region with Han Chinese residents.25 Nevertheless, the
outnumbering of the Uyghur has in many ways strengthened the identity of this ethnic group,
which, in the face of “the Han other,” has grown more distinct and tightly-knit. Therefore, while
there is now a higher population of Han Chinese now in Xinjiang, the 2009 Ürümqi riots show
that ethnic tension still exists in Xinjiang, and China’s efforts to increase stability in the region
have been largely ineffective.
Uyghur ethnic identity is also made more distinct because the differing religious
traditions of these two groups fuel tension and complicate Uyghur integration into Han China.
Religious and cultural tension is exacerbated by the fact that the Uyghur, who are primarily
Sunni Muslims, live in a society that officially guarantees “freedom of religious belief” in its
constitution, but often discourages any belief system that can threaten the CCP’s monopoly on
22

Ibid.
Ibid.
24
Cliff, "The Partnership,” 83.
25
Edward Wong, “To Temper Unrest in Western China, Officials Offer Money for Intermarriage,” New York Times,
September 2, 2014, accessed October 15, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/03/world/asia/to-temper-unrestchina-pushes-interethnic-marriage-between-han-and-minorities.html.
23

12
Jai
power.26 The CCP’s seemingly insincere “religious freedom” policy not only confuses and
frustrates the Uyghur, but also acts as a barrier to political participation. For example, in 1991
the Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee issued “The Notice on Proper
Settlement of the Issue of Party Members’ Religious Belief.”27 This policy disallowed members
of the Party from self-identifying as belonging to a particular religious sect, or participating in
any religious activities. However, since religion is at the heart of Uyghur ethnic identity, the
political opportunities of the Uyghur are limited by their core identity as a race founded upon a
religion. Therefore, since they are unable to exercise much influence in local government, the
Uyghur do not feel a part of the society which is dominated by largely secular Han politics.

Poverty is the root of terrorism
Scholars have also examined how China uses economic development policies to solidify its
control over Xinjiang and to diffuse ethnic tension. These scholars cite Uyghur-Han earning
differentials as a main cause of intergroup tensions and conflicts in Xinjiang, as well as a sense
of relative deprivation on the part of the Uyghur. Yufan Hao and Wenhua Liu argue that earning
differentials between the Uyghur and Han show that economic inequality is vast. Indeed many
Uyghur feel they are economically disadvantaged.28 For example, there is an extremely high
proportion of Uyghur farmers, and a low proportion of professional technical workers with
relatively higher salaries—a disparity that is increasingly obvious to the Uyghur because of
urbanization, the Internet, and television.29 The CCP approached this issue through the Invest in

26

Council on Foreign Relations, “Religion in China,” accessed December 1, 2015,
http://www.cfr.org/china/religion-china/p16272.
27
Zang, Xiaowei, “Uyghur-Han Earning,” 144.
28
Hao and Liu, “Xinjiang: Increasing Pain,” 214.
29
Zang, Xiaowei, “Uyghur-Han Earning,” 143.
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the West or Open-Up the West Project, known in Chinese as 西部大开发, a policy that aims to
more evenly distribute China’s wealth and resources, which are primarily concentrated in the
East.30 Xinjiang is a major recipient of these policy funds. In fact, only a few years ago Premier
of the PRC Li Keqiang announced that “the region's development and stability are at a critical
moment” so Beijing would “invest another 7.26 billion yuan ($1.13 billion) in municipal
infrastructure construction and other livelihood programs in Hotan in south Xinjiang.”31
However, the Han have been the main beneficiaries of this economic growth in Xinjiang due to
discriminatory hiring practices, and what scholar Jessica Koch terms “non-engaging economic
development.” Basically, Koch argues that the main reason why economic growth cannot solve
the Uyghur issue is that this development is “imposed” rather than “negotiated.”32 Indeed, Hao
and Liu agree that although the “living standard for most Uyghurs has been improved, some still
do not think they have benefited from the Reform and Open-up Policy or West Development
Campaign, which they feel is just aimed at transferring the oil and gas from the Uyghur region to
the Han region.”33 Therefore, campaigns for economic development in Xinjiang have had the
adverse effect of worsening ethnic tension through a combination of social discrimination,
economic inequality, and a sense of relative deprivation and even exploitation.

Closing the gap through education
Another prevalent area of scholarship has examined how the Chinese government uses education
directives to gain a firmer hold on Xinjiang. For example, one education campaign seeks to
30

Ibid.
Yuan, Yuan, “More Help, More Prosperity,” Beijing Review 32 (2011): 1, accessed October 15, 2015,
http://www.bjreview.com/Cover_Stories_Series_2011/2011-08/08/content_382091.htm.
32
Jessica Koch, “Economic Development and Ethnic Separatism in Western China: A New Model of Peripheral
Nationalism,” (PhD diss., Asia Research Center at the University of Amsterdam, 2006): 6.
33
Hao and Liu, “Xinjiang: Increasing Pain,” 217.
31
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promote the Mandarin dialect of Chinese, or 普通话, as a way to close the gap between the Han
and Uyghur in the tense region. The reasoning behind this particular policy is that the Uyghur’s
weaker command of Mandarin (their native tongue is a Turkic language known by the Han as 维
族话) is a driving force behind their inability to fully integrate into Han society, and also a
practical reason why they are less successful in the workplace. Indeed, Eric Schluessel argues
that “Uyghur identity, as understood and articulated by the secular elite, is fundamentally
linguistic,”34 and Chien-peng Chung argues that “Many Uyghurs do not speak Mandarin
Chinese, which is usually a prerequisite for good paying jobs or government positions.”35
Consequently, the government established Mandarin-focused “bilingual” schools throughout
Xinjiang. In theory they seek to promote Uyghur childrens’ “bilingual” education, but in
practice, they force Mandarin over and above any other language, which further marginalizes the
Uyghur.36
Moreover, this plan to “raise the cultural quality of Xinjiang people” through education is
largely unworkable, as its implementation depends on educational resources that are simply not
available, such as a sufficient number of qualified instructors.37 As a result, scholars note that
this language imposition actually fuels bitterness among the Uyghur, who are “resentful about

34

Eric T. Schluessel, “History, Identity, and Mother-tongue Education in Xinjiang,” Central Asian Survey 28.4
(2009): 384, accessed September 25, 2015, doi: 10.1080/02634930903577144.
35
Chung Chien-peng, “China's 'War on Terror': September 11 and Uighur Separatism,” Council on Foreign
Relations, July/August, 2002, accessed October 1, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-war-terror-september-11uighur-separatism/p4765.
36
Schluessel, “History, Identity, and Mother-Tongue,” 394.
37
Ibid., 395-396.
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the marginalization of the Uyghur language and interpret the language policy as just another ploy
by the Chinese government to encroach on their cultural identity and dilute their heritage.”38

The war on terror and diversionary strategy
More recently, scholars have moved on from examination of these ineffective methods employed
by the Chinese government to evaluation of how China leveraged the international hysteria
surrounding the 9/11 attacks in 2001 to consolidate power in Xinjiang. A major theme
dominating this scholarship is the diversionary theory of war put forth by Jaroslav Tir and
Michael Jasinski, and applied to China by more recent scholars. The diversionary theory of war
asserts that when confronted with public antagonism over domestic issues, government leaders
sometimes divert the populaces’ attention from these problems, and thereby, survive
politically.39 This method is extremely attractive to China, which, as a totalitarian regime without
free elections, greatly fears public discontent and uncontrolled nationalism. This is because these
outpourings of public feeling have historically threatened the regime’s monopoly on power and
control.40 For example, one of China’s most significant challenges right now is controlling antiforeign nationalism (primarily against Japan and the U.S.), which, thanks to the creation of
online communities, is a rallying point for grassroots nationalists.41 A nationalism that unites the
majority against the Uyghur minority displaces this uncontrolled, anti-foreign nationalism, and is
damaging for China’s foreign relations, transferring public outrage from an external “other” to
38

Rosalyn Ching Mun Lim, “Religion, Ethnicity, and Economic Marginalization as Drivers of Conflict in Xinjiang,”
(PhD diss., Georgetown University, 2011): 77.
39
Jaroslav Tir and Michael Jasinski, “Domestic-Level Diversionary Theory of War: Targeting Ethnic Minorities,”
The Journal of Conflict Resolution 52.5 (2008): 641, accessed November 5, 2015, doi: 10.1177/0022002708318565.
40
John Knight, “Economic Causes and Cures of Social Instability in China,” China & World Economy 22.2 (2014),
accessed December 12, 2015, doi: 10.1111/j.1749-124X.2014.12059.x.
41
Shunji Cui, “Problems of Nationalism and Historical Memory in China’s Relations with Japan,” Journal of
Historical Sociology 25.2 (2012): 203-210, accessed December 15, 2015, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6443.2011.01419.x.
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an “internal one that is much easier for the Chinese government to monitor and control.”42
Consistent with Tir and Jasinski’s focus on the connection between nationalism and the use of
diversionary force, J. Snyder likewise argues that in China, controlled nationalism is employed to
divert the attention of the public away from problematic domestic issues. Furthermore, Kilic
Bugra Kanat uses Tir and Jasinski’s diversionary theory to argue that the war on terror presented
the perfect opportunity for China to divert public attention from recurring domestic troubles
towards a “suspect community,” and to create a new, controlled anti-Uyghur nationalism.43
Besides augmenting political stability in China, the war on terror also allowed China to
garner international legitimacy. Indeed, China has been severely criticized since Tiananmen, and
this criticism has only been intensified by the Senkaku/Diaoyu island disputes and the Taiwan
issue.44 Thus, 2001 presented a favorable time for China to regain soft power in the West by
portraying itself as an ally of the U.S. in a fight against a common enemy: global terrorism.
Chien-peng Chung observes that the Uyghur were chosen as China’s local terrorist threat: “The
September 11 attacks and the subsequent crisis offered an opportunity for the government to
reframe its battle with the Uyghur separatists as part of a larger international struggle against
terrorism.”45 In the subsequent months and years, China supported this hypothesis by actually
framing tightened security in Xinjiang and more limited cultural and religious freedom for the
Uyghur as their contribution to the war on terror. At first, this designation of the Uyghur as
China’s domestic terrorists was not accepted by the international community; when China first
referenced the ETIM in an official state document in 2001 titled “Terrorist Activities Perpetrated
42

Ibid.
Kilic Bugra Kanat, “ ‘War on Terror’ as a Diversionary Strategy: Personifying Minorities as Terrorists in the
People's Republic of China,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 32.4 (2012): 512-518, accessed October 2, 2015,
doi:10.1080/13602004.2012.746179.
44
Kanat, “ ‘War on Terror’ ,” 512.
45
Chung, “China's 'War on Terror’,” 10.
43
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by ‘East Turkestan’ Organizations and their Ties with Osama bin Laden and the Taliban”, the
U.N. and U.S. both refused to accept the nexus between the ETIM and terrorism. Instead, both
the ETIM and ETLO were considered separatist organizations, and China was accused of
unjustifiably conflating separatism with terrorism.46 However, less than a year later in 2002, both
the U.N. and U.S. reversed this policy view, and officially added the ETIM to a global list of
terrorist organizations, with promises to defund this organization.47 Furthermore, in 2011,
WikiLeaks published a file about the Guantanamo Bay prison camp that revealed twenty-two
suspected Uyghur were held there since shortly after 9/11,48 a fact affirmed by a U.S.
congressional record article later that year, which referred to the Uyghur detainees at
Guantanamo Bay as “trained terrorists.”49
China’s increasing crackdown on Xinjiang has been exhaustively documented and
analyzed by scholars on China. Kanat, Chung, and other China specialists like Matthew
Teague,50 Teemu Naarajärvi51, and Sean Roberts52 all extensively analyzed trends in the CCP’s
treatment of the Uyghur. For example, Kanat applies a qualitative analysis primarily to other
scholarly articles and Chinese reports. Naarajärvi, likewise, focuses on Chinese studies and
official statements. Sean Roberts, on the other hand, examines alleged Uyghur terrorists attacks

46

Sean Roberts, “Imaginary Terrorism? The Global War on Terror and the Narrative of the Uyghur Terrorist
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in China and corresponding Chinese statements about these attacks in an effort to frame the
designation of China’s efforts in Xinjiang as part of the war on terror.
These scholars exclusively focus on how China appropriated the “war on terror” to justify
the harsh repression of the Uyghur. Though their research is important to understanding how the
international community responded to 9/11, it is equally important to examine how the U.S., as
the instigator of the official war on terror, in essence aided and abetted China’s policy toward the
Uyghur. A detailed study of changes in the U.S. framing of the Uyghur pre- and post-9/11 can
offer valuable insight into the ways that the U.S. changed it rhetoric leading up to and following
major policy decisions that affect the Uyghur, such as its designation of the ETIM as a terrorist
organization. In particular, the official documents provide valuable insight into the framing of
this ethnic minority in U.S. public discourse. Indeed, this thesis argues that in addition to
historically framing the Uyghur as victims of human rights abuses, in response to China’s
appropriation of the war on terror, the U.S. created and perpetuated three conflicting frames onto
the Uyghur: a frame that extends this victim narrative to include the victimization on the basis of
the war on terror; a markedly distinct frame that admits the possibility of Uyghur violence; and a
final frame that directly acknowledges and even condemns the Uyghur as terrorists.

Data and methodology
This paper compiles and analyzes official source documents from the U.S. in order to inform the
scholarly community about how the U.S. understanding of China’s treatment of the Uyghur
changed and continues to change because of the war on terror, and the types of frames projected
onto this controversial ethnic group. I examine official U.S. documents and statements about the
Uyghur before and after the attacks on September 11, 2001. Given that the major news agencies
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in China like Xinhua or The People’s Daily associated with statements about the “Uyghur
terrorism problem” are state-controlled, the U.S. counterpart of these statements consist of
documents from state-controlled sources of information. These U.S. statements, like the
documents from state-controlled news sources in China, are produced by the government and are
therefore accessible to the general public within and outside of the U.S. The overall category of
U.S. statements is divided into several subcategories based primarily on their source: the Library
of Congress, the Department of State, and the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
(CECC). In addition to organizing the data into subcategories, I also lay out the following
protocol for data recording: 1) date (pre-9/11 or post); 2) type of U.S. official document; 3)
specific number of mentions of Xinjiang,Uyghur/Uighur, separatist, terrorist, or extremist; 4)
outstanding quotes; 5) analysis of overall language use, broader values, norms, ideologies, and
other contextual factors embedded in a particular (set of) document(s) as well as the intended
audience/purpose; and 6) people to contact for follow-up interviews.
Examining how the Uyghur are differently framed over time due to the war on terror
requires a methodology suited to understanding the oftentimes ambiguous and even multiple or
changing meanings of public statements on this complex and evolving political issue.
Consequently, this paper utilizes the strengths of qualitative discourse analysis to interpret the
primary data and to place these interpretations into a coherent, useful analysis. Qualitative
discourse analysis is a valuable method of analysis for two main reasons. First, qualitative
discourse analysis seeks to “deal with the richness of complexities,” and to search for underlying
meanings by using the context of broader values, norms, ideologies, and other contextual factors
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in a document.53 Second, qualitative discourse analysis can be used to track shifts in state and
party ideologies and news coverage. Indeed, this method is well-suited to track changes in
discourse about the Uyghur in official U.S. documents because it incorporates the premise that
the formation of a discourse is a purposeful, active process.54 I deploy qualitative discourse
analysis to interpret data from official documents with the ultimate purpose of identifying clear
trends in the U.S. over time with regard to how the Uyghur’s are framed in state-sanctioned
discourse.
Though these two advantages make qualitative discourse analysis the most promising
method of research for the following data sets, this method is not without its limitations. Critics
argue that this type of analysis is overly subjective, so the interpretation of data can be skewed to
fit the researcher’s hypothesis. Indeed, scholars sometimes reject research employing qualitative
discourse analysis on the grounds that the scholar’s interpretation of data is incomplete and
potentially biased. Proponents of qualitative discourse analysis acknowledge the subjectivity of
interpretation, but argue that a principled and intellectual defensible deployment of this
subjectivity can help to produce a more critical and accurate interpretation than one achieved
through quantitative data. While it can be helpful to look at the lexical collates to the Uyghur, to
understand how the Uyghur are framed over the period of many years, even decades, scholars
need to deploy an interpretive method of analysis that allows for a deeper examination of the
ideational collates to the Uyghur. Though “official documents are intended to be read as

53

Jared J. Wesley, “The Qualitative Analysis of Documents,” From Text to Political Positions: Text Analysis Across
Disciplines, ed. Bertie Kaal et al. (Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 2014), 143.
54
See, for example, Richardson’s use of qualitative discourse analysis to record how the “ideational framing” of
British Muslims in journalistic texts changed over the course of three elections by taking comprehensive samples of
newspaper reports to analyze how discourse changed in these media texts over time.

21
Jai
objective statements of fact,” they are in reality “socially produced.”55 Official U.S. statements
always have an agenda, and sometimes those purposes may be ambiguous or not explicitly
stated, and the meaning drawn from those statements by government actors may even change as
U.S. interests and analyses of a situation shift. Ambiguous or concealed agenda can be
uncovered by elucidating how state actors engage in discursive practices in an effort to
(re)produce hegemonic understanding of the target object—in this case the Uyghur and their
relationship to China. Since discourse and language are understood as a social practice,
qualitative discourse analysis reinforces the idea that the formation of a discourse is itself an
active means of political and social change, which in turn allows for the interpretation of the
framing of the Uyghur in official, public discourse in the U.S. as an active social practice with an
ultimate purpose that can be discovered.
Obviously this research does not include classified U.S. documents on the Uyghur. No
doubt access to these materials would help scholars gain a fuller and more complete picture of
how the Uyghur issue affects relations between the U.S. and China. Nevertheless, unclassified
official government documents still offer valuable insight into how, and perhaps why, the U.S.
government frames the Uyghur issue as it does through its various branches of government and
other official political venue. This framing is in itself a decidedly worthwhile facet of
international relations, because changes in discourse have the potential to inform us about
changes in policies and, ultimately, political relationships. Discerning the rationale behind why
an official document refers to the Uyghur may aid our understanding of the timing and logic
supporting major policy changes, like the decision to designate the East Turkestan Independence
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Movement as a terrorist organization in 2002, and the choice to imprison twenty-two suspected
Uyghur ETIM members in Guantanamo Bay.
Applying qualitative discourse analysis to U.S. official documents also allows one to
critically assess the hypothesis that China not only appropriated the war on terror, it also coopted the U.S. in its efforts to crack down on the Uyghur. Indeed, this research challenges said
hypothesis by demonstrating that U.S. responses to China’s use of the war on terror rhetoric
actually fall on more of a spectrum.

Figure 2 portrays how the U.S. varied its responses to China’s bold claims of Uyghur
terrorism. Some of these responses framed the Uyghur as victims of human rights abuses, while
others did not fully discount the possibility of Uyghur terrorism, but more carefully characterized
them as separatists. Lastly, some official documents fell on the far right of the spectrum because
they clearly framed the Uyghur as terrorists. In light of the enduring and pervasive impact
throughout the world of the U.S. war on terror, but especially in Muslim populations, scholars
must not only evaluate whether and how other countries appropriated this anti-terrorism
campaign, but also how the U.S. responded to external appropriation of official state language on
combating terror. The following four frames present four distinct ways the U.S. responded to
China’s appropriation of the war on terror.
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Uyghur as victims
I argue that the U.S. changed its discursive practice of identifying the Uyghur as human rights
victims and instead moved to associate the Uyghur with violent resistance and terrorism. The
eventual political shift to the ETIM being designated as a terrorist organization was presaged by
the discursive movements manifested in official U.S. statements in multiple public arenas.
The first association evident throughout these official statements is made between the
Uyghur and the harsh treatment and oppression imposed on them by China. This history of
referring to the Uyghur as victims of a repressive regime constitutes a useful baseline for
tracking subsequent changes in association. Prior to 9/11, the Uyghur are referred to exclusively
as victims of rampant human rights abuses in XUAR. Many of these texts are linked in their
condemnation of the Chinese government’s treatment of the Uyghur minority, and advocacy of
more religious freedom and cultural diversification. For example, a concurrent (i.e., non-binding)
resolution proposed in Congress in 2000 stated:
The Chinese government has imprisoned a person from almost every Uyghur family in Ghulja City since
1996. At present, the Chinese government is still arresting hundreds of Uyghur and mercilessly torturing
them in the prisons. The Chinese human rights violation of the Uyghur people is nowhere to be found in the
world.56

This concurrent resolution’s purpose was to urge the Chinese government to release Rebiya
Kadeer, the Uyghur human rights activist, so the statement that “a person from almost every
Uyghur family in Ghulia,” a city in Northwestern Xinjiang, has been imprisoned and
“mercilessly tortur[ed]” works to advance this cause by emphasizing the extreme extent to which
the government’s hand reached—that is, into almost every Uyghur household. Obviously, the
U.S. cannot impose their rule of law on China; even a joint resolution passed by Congress and
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signed by the President would have no legal consequence. Because of this lack of enforceability,
some may argue that concurrent resolutions are not a useful means of analyzing U.S. politics.
Moreover, this particular concurrent resolution failed to pass, upon a Congressional vote of 170260. Yet the very lack of enforceability and overwhelming defeat of this concurrent resolution
begs us to question why members of Congress bothered to consider it at all. Sometimes joint
resolutions are proposed to satisfy a domestic constituency, but it is, prima facie, implausible to
suggest that a serious domestic constituency exists in the U.S. that has the political heft to
influence U.S. support of the Uyghur population. More plausible is that Congress sought to
engage in U.S.-China relations by discursively invoking the status and bodies of the Uyghur
minority as victims of Chinese human rights abuses. Change in discourse can produce a change
in politics, and even an unenforceable resolution can nonetheless impact Sino-U.S. relations.
Therefore, although this document was never presented to the Chinese government, it still shows
how, prior to 9/11, members of the U.S. government framed the Uyghur as human rights victims,
with the clear intent of presenting this frame to the Chinese government in public discourse.
This framing of the Chinese government as abusive and intrusive was not new in 2000,
nor strictly associated with human rights violations against the Uyghur. In May of 1999, a
congressional resolution on the tenth anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre was
released. This resolution holds a particularly contemptuous tone towards governmental authority
in China:
[P]erhaps any representative of the government could tell us that there are no persecuted Christians in
China. Perhaps they could tell us there is no ethnic and religious persecution in Tibet or Xinjiang. Perhaps
they could tell us there are no forced abortions or forced sterilization, no dying rooms for unwanted
children, usually baby girls and usually handicapped children. They also perhaps could tell us there is no
political suppression or dissent and no torture. Of course, we would know that is a lie, but it is about time
we held them to account.57
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Unsurprisingly, this simple resolution passed with an overwhelming majority: 418-0. After all,
how could any member of the House vote against a bill to “express sympathy for the families of
those killed” in the 1989 democratic protests, and condemn “egregious human rights abuses by
the Chinese government?”58 Though the Uyghur are seldom mentioned in the news or pubic
school curriculums, the persecution of Christians, forced sterilizations, and the Tiananmen
Square Massacre are held up as examples of atrocities in China. Therefore, by grouping human
rights abuses against the Uyghur in Xinjiang with these more widely known abuses, the Uyghur
issue assumes the negativity surrounding these other controversial issues.
Prior to 9/11, in U.S. official documents, the Uyghur were mentioned exclusively in
reference to human rights issues, rather than associated with terrorism, or defended as nonviolent
activists. As a result, the U.S. did little more for the Uyghur than support Rebiya Kadeer and
issue concurrent resolutions protesting human rights abuses. Also, neither the Uyghur nor
Xinjiang appear anywhere on the Congressional Executive Commission on China’s website prior
to 2002. Moreover, there is no mention of China, let alone the Uyghur, in the Department of
State’s annual Patterns of Global Terrorism Report prior to 9/11. Although, this report notes that
“several nations in East Asia experienced violence in 2000,” China is not listed among these
nations.59 On the other hand, the Uyghur appear in the Department of State’s International
Religious Freedom Report and International Human Rights Report prior to 9/11:
In China . . . particularly serious human rights abuses persisted in minority areas, especially in Tibet and
Xinjiang, where restrictions on religion and other fundamental freedoms intensified. Some minority groups,
particularly Tibetan Buddhists and Muslim Uighurs, came under increasing pressure as the Government
clamped down on dissent and "separatist" activities.60
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At this point, Tibetan Buddhists and Muslim Uyghur were often referenced together as victims
of China’s repressive, anti-religion policies. The Uyghur were not yet differentiated by either
China or the U.S. as more closely associated with any terrorism or tension with the Middle East.
Furthermore, “separatist” appears in quotation marks, suggesting that the State Department
questioned this designation. Similarly, the International Religious Freedom Report issued a few
months before 9/11 cites police crackdowns on centers of Muslim religious activity and worship
in Xinjiang because of accusations from the local police of Uyghur separatist activity.61 In
addition, although several terrorist incidents are mentioned in this report, none are associated
with the Uyghur, either directly or indirectly. Instead, these events are attributed to “unknown
terrorists.”62 At this point, some may argue that the U.S.’s dismissal of accusations of Uyghur
violence before 9/11 is due to the fact that the Uyghur were nonviolent before 9/11 and China’s
subsequent crackdown. However, this argument focuses on how, despite China’s claims of
Uyghur violence well before 9/11, the U.S. continued to classify the Uyghur as “separatists” at
worst, and more commonly as victims of human rights abuses until after 9/11.

Victims of the war on terror
The U.S. framing of the Uyghur changed dramatically after 9/11. Indeed, following the
September 1, 2001 attacks, this narrative of the Uyghur as victims of China’s repressive regime
was extended to a view of the Uyghur as victims of China’s war on terror. Scholars documented
and analyzed how the Chinese government leveraged the war on terror to deflect public attention
away from domestic problems and create solidarity in the face of the perception of a terrorist
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threat.63 The U.S. government, likewise, noted and criticized this ulterior motive in many of its
public statements. For example, in a Congressional article released about a month after 9/11, a
representative stated:
Following the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, Chinese officials pledged to join the global
effort against terrorism. But comments made by Chinese officials following the attacks indicate that they
may try to exact policy concessions from the United States in exchange for support for anti-terrorism
efforts. For example, according to a Reuters article on September 18, China's Foreign Ministry Spokesman
Zhu Bangzao stated, “The United States has asked China to provide assistance in the fight against
terrorism. China, by the same token, has reasons to ask the United States to give its support and
understanding in the fight against terrorism and separatists.”64

Here, the U.S. directly questions China’s motives behind its alleged support for U.S.
antiterrorism efforts. Although the Uyghur are not mentioned specifically, the speaker points out
that China’s assistance comes with the caveat of policy concessions exacted from the U.S.;
specifically, the policy concession that the U.S. allow China more freedom in its domestic fight
against “terrorism and separatists.” Against the backdrop of frequent associations between
Tibetans and Uyghur with terrorism and separatism, the price of China’s support for the U.S. war
on terror was allowing China a freer hand in its treatment of groups like the Uyghur. The Uyghur
were more directly referred to as victims of China’s war on terror in subsequent government
documents:
Meanwhile, in northwest China, the international war against terrorism is used to justify harsh repression in
Xinjiang, home to China's mainly Muslim Uighur community. Several mosques have been closed, use of
the Uighur language has been restricted and certain Uighur books and journals have been banned. The
crackdown against suspected “separatists, terrorists and religious extremists” intensified following the start
of a renewed security crack-down in October 2003. Arrests continue and hundreds of dissidents remain in
prison.65

In this quote, found in another concurrent resolution released on the anniversary of the
Tiananmen Square Massacre, it is apparent that the Uyghur issue became closely connected with
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this more well-known instance of human rights abuse in China. Even the title of the resolution
patently denounces China: “Condemning the Crackdown on Democracy Protestors in
Tiananmen Square, Beijing in the People’s Republic of China on the 15th Anniversary of that
Tragic Massacre.” However, in contrast to previous documents which clearly conflate human
rights abuses in Xinjiang with those in Tiananmen, this particular document goes further by
specifically identifying the war on terror as the very tool China employs to implement its
repressive religious and ethnic policies. Indeed, after introducing the idea that the war on terror is
used to “justify harsh repression in Xinjiang,” this statement lists specific examples of the
application of this anti-terrorism campaign to the Uyghur, including shutting down mosques,
banning religious books, and imprisoning dissidents. Here in the U.S., one’s religious freedom is
considered a constitutional right, so this statement paints Xinjiang as nothing short of a dystopia
controlled by the authoritarian regime that is the Chinese government.
This oppressor-oppressed narrative continues throughout this period and up to the
present in various official documents articulating U.S. policy. For example, in its most recent
human rights report, U.S. State Department states, “The government continued to repress
Uyghurs expressing peaceful political dissent and independent Muslim religious leaders.”66
Another Congressional concurrent resolution urging the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights to call on the PRC’s government to end human rights violations also included China’s
leveraging of the war on terror against the Uyghur as a strong reason for U.N. action: “The
Chinese Government has used the international war on terror as a pretext for a harsh crackdown
on Uighurs in Xinjiang, including those expressing peaceful political dissent and independent
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Muslim religious leaders.”67 These documents, which clearly fall among those depicting the
Uyghur as victims of the war on terror, also clearly discount the notion of a substantiated Uyghur
terrorist threat in China. Indeed, in its annual report in 2006, the U.S. Congress discredited
China’s claims of increasing terrorist activity in Xinjiang by looking at the broader context of
China’s history of repression in the region:
The government uses counterterrorism policies as a pretext for severely repressing religion in the XUAR.
The government describes security conditions in the XUAR in a manner that suggests terrorist attacks
continue in the region, even as official sources indicate that no terrorist attacks have taken place in the
XUAR since 1999. Authorities continue to detain and arrest XUAR residents engaged in religious activities
deemed unauthorized and have charged them with a range of offenses, including state security crimes. The
government targets "religious extremism," splittism, and terrorism in anti-crime campaigns, calling them
the "three evil forces." The government began tightening control over religious practice in the region in the
early 1990s, following unrest in the region, but intensified its crackdown after September 11, 2001. Official
sources published in 2001 recorded an increase in the number of Uighurs sent to prison or reeducation
through labor centers since the mid-1990s because of religious activity.68

Here a U.S. state entity again projects a discursive frame that directly conflicts with the
discursive frame put forth by the Chinese government, that is, the portrayal of the Uyghur as a
group harboring the “three evil forces” of extremism, separatism, and terrorism. Instead, this
document details the application of this anti-crime campaign with strong language and outright
dismissal. Indeed, this document states “official sources indicate that no terrorist attacks have
taken place in the XUAR since 1999.” Based on this last claim, it becomes apparent that there is
a discrepancy between this denial of terrorism in Xinjiang and the U.S. decision to add the ETIM
to its list of terrorist organizations in 2002. And indeed, the aforementioned texts all support the
idea that the U.S. sees the Uyghur as nothing more than repressed victims of the Chinese
government.
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Qualified disapproval
As Figure 2 shows, the United State’s framing of the Uyghur cannot be categorized as one
which completely rejects Uyghur terrorism, nor one which blatantly describes the Uyghur as
terrorists. Instead, this framing can be arranged into a spectrum, which ranges from discourse
that frames the Uyghur as victims, to discourse that frames the Uyghur as terrorists. These next
documents can be categorized as a group of texts which propagate a discourse that neither
directly associates the Uyghur with terrorism, nor fully discounts the possibility of violent
Uyghur resistance. Taken at face value, these texts seem to perpetuate the aforementioned victim
narrative. However, a closer examination of the wording in these texts reveals small, but
significant, deviation from previously discussed official documents. While the CECC blatantly
dismisses Uyghur terrorism in a 2006 statement, other U.S. statements do not take such a clear
stand on either side of the issue. For example, the Congressional concurrent resolution from 2005
includes the statement that “the Chinese Government has used the international war on terror as
a pretext for a harsh crackdown on Uighurs in Xinjiang, including those expressing peaceful
political dissent and independent Muslim religious leaders.”69 Like previously analyzed
documents, this text spots how China uses the war on terror as a “pretext” for consolidating
power in the region. Unlike other statements, however, this document allows for the possibility
of Uyghur violence through the word “including.” Indeed, this wording implies that among the
Uyghur, there are those who do not express “peaceful political dissent.” After all, a Uyghur
group that includes peaceful dissenters leaves room for the possibility of militant members—a
possibility that was incompatible with previous victim narratives. A similar differentiation is
made in the State Department’s “International Report on Religious Freedom” from 2004 and
69
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2014. Indeed, all these reports either repeat verbatim or paraphrase this claim: “[A]uthorities
often failed to distinguish between peaceful religious practice and criminal or terrorist
activities.”70 Again, the language employed in this text allows for the possibility of a range
between the peaceful activist and the “terrorist” which could include “criminal.”
Even a human rights report from 2003 seems unwilling to either completely dismiss or
call out Uyghur violence:
Because the Government authorities in Xinjiang regularly grouped together those involved in “ethnic
separatism, illegal religious activities, and violent terrorism,” it was often unclear whether particular raids,
detentions, or judicial punishments targeted those peacefully seeking their goals or those engaged in
violence. Many observers raised concerns that the Government's war on terror was a justification for
cracking down harshly on Uighurs expressing peaceful political dissent and on independent Muslim
religious leaders. On December 15, the Government published an “East Turkestan Terrorist List,” which
labeled organizations such as the World Uighur Youth Congress and the East Turkestan Information Center
as terrorist entities. These groups openly advocate for East Turkestan independence, but have not been
publicly linked to violent activity.71

Recall that U.S. official statements are socially produced rather than objective statements of
facts, and even the slightest deviation in wording can indicate a political decision on the part of
public officials. With this in mind, the decision to qualify a condemnation of the Chinese
government’s crackdown with the phrase that it is “unclear whether particular raids, detentions,
or judicial punishments targeted those peacefully seeking their goals or those engaged in
violence” cannot be overlooked, but must be taken as a purposeful phrasing. This statement
exhibits a rather cautious attitude towards the Uyghur issue, and it signals the possibility of the
Uyghur as terrorists.
Furthermore, rather than directly denouncing China for leveraging the war on terror, this
document attributes speculation of ulterior motives on China’s part to third party observers:
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“[M]any observers raised concerns that the Government's war on terror was a justification for
cracking down harshly on Uighurs.” This tendency of the U.S. to pass the responsibility of
implicating China in the exploration of the war on terror for political ends manifests in several
other documents. Like the State Department, the CECC also attributes accusations of foul play
on the part of China to nongovernmental actors in a commission analysis in 2005:
In January 2004, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization opened a Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure in
Tashkent to fight the "three evils of terrorism, splittism, and extremism" in Xinjiang and bordering member
states. Amnesty International and other human rights groups accuse the Chinese government of using the
post-September 11th global war on terrorism to repress peaceful Uighur demonstrations for autonomy. The
US-based Center for Contemporary Conflict published a report in 2002 urging policymakers to recognize
that Uighurs themselves are often divided over how best to promote their rights. The report concluded that
only increased autonomy could prevent increases in violence.72

Rather than directly accuse China of co-opting the war on terror, accusations are assigned to
“Amnesty International [and] other human rights groups,” which are conveniently out of the
control of the U.S. government. On the other hand, the proposal that the Uyghur are “divided
over how to promote their rights” is attributed to the Center for Contemporary Conflict, a U.S.based research group, not the CECC. In this way, the CECC simultaneously criticizes China’s
anti-terrorism efforts and differentiates between methods of protest among the Uyghur without
actually laying claim to either statement. By passing this heavy burden of accusation onto the
shoulders of non-state entities, the U.S. demonstrates an unwillingness to take a firm position on
either side of the issue. Rather, the safest, most diplomatic choice appears to be one where
human rights violations are reprimanded, and the issue of Uyghur terrorism is not directly
addressed.
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Uyghur as threats
A final trend that is identifiable throughout U.S. documents leading up to and following 9/11 is
the formation of a discourse that frames the Uyghur as a dangerous group of extremists, and even
as potential terrorists. Though the previous three frames seem to contradict U.S. policy decisions
to treat Uyghur as threats to international safety, this final frame helps to explain this behavior.
Indeed, in the following documents, the Uyghur are not described primarily as human rights
victims, and China is not as harshly criticized for cracking down on Xinjiang. Instead, the U.S.
and China seem to form a partnership in an effort to fight international terrorism. This discourse,
which falls more towards the far right of the framing spectrum (see Figure 2), is quite apparent in
the 2001 Patterns of Global Terrorism report.
China, and Thailand also suffered a number of bombings throughout the year, many believed by authorities
to be the work of Islamic extremists in those countries; few arrests have been made, however . . . Chinese
officials strongly condemned the September 11 attacks and announced China would strengthen cooperation
with the international community in fighting terrorism on the basis of the UN Charter and international law
. . . China and the United States began a counterterrorism dialogue in late-September . . . [that] undertook a
number of measures to improve China’s counterterrorism posture and domestic security. These included
increasing its vigilance in Xinjiang, western China, where Uighur separatist groups have conducted violent
attacks in recent years.73

This report is in stark contrast to the 2000 Patterns of Global Terrorism report, which contained
no mention of the Uyghur, let alone Uyghur violence. In that report, China was not included
among the "Several nations in East Asia [that] experienced terrorist violence in 2000.”74 Here
China is directly and indisputably the victim of “bombings” that are “believed to be the work of
Islamic extremists.” The word “suffered” emphasizes a victim narrative, previously unseen prior
to 9/11, where the Uyghur were assigned the roles of the victims, and China, the perpetrator.
Furthermore, the Uyghur are strongly associated with these bombings, as the end of this
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statement notes that anti-terrorism efforts in the region involve “increasing its vigilance in
Xinjiang, western China, where Uighur separatist groups have conducted violent attacks in
recent years.” Though other official documents actively dismiss China’s claims of Uyghur
violence in the region, this State Department publication does exactly the opposite by
recognizing Uyghur violence as an issue intimately connected with international terrorism, rather
than a product of China’s political imagination or an excuse to crackdown on an independentminded ethnic minority. Moreover, this statement highlights U.S.-China cooperation in the war
on terror. Though other statements focus mainly on the policy concessions China aims to exact
for such cooperation, after noting China’s promise to cooperate with international antiterrorism
efforts, this statement goes on to detail active bilateral cooperation at the end of 2001.
The Uyghur are further vilified in the official documents of other state entities. A 2009
Congressional record article on the subject of the twenty-two Uyghur prisoners held in
Guantanamo Bay includes several statements that directly frame the Uyghur people as
dangerous. For example, Republican congressman Frank R. Wolf of Virginia states, “[Uyghur]
detainees are trained terrorists who were caught in camps affiliated with Al Qaeda” and “There
have been published reports that these terrorists were members of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic
Movement, ETIM, a designated terrorist organization affiliated with Al Qaeda.” Later, Wolf
even states, “Those who would use terror are terrorists no matter their intended target.”75 By the
end of this statement, it is clear that in moving the conversation from the concrete issue of
Uyghur terrorism, to an amorphous, ill-defined fear of terrorism in general, the Uyghur are
presumed to be terrorists.
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Most references to Uyghur terrorism accompany statements about the ETIM. Indeed, this
association between the Uyghur and ETIM works in a way similar to the association between the
oppression of the Uyghur and the Tiananmen Square Massacre. In documents that uphold the
Uyghur victim narrative, references to Tiananmen are employed to strengthen the connection
between well-known human rights abuses in Tiananmen, and current, lesser-known offenses in
Xinjiang. In this new narrative that presents the Uyghur as terrorists, associations between the
Uyghur and the ETIM work similarly by creating the perception of Uyghur militancy. This is
best demonstrated in the 2002 CECC report:
The Chinese government supports the U.S.-led global war on terrorism, but critics argue that Beijing is
using terrorism as an excuse to crack down on human rights and religious freedoms of the Uighur Muslim
population in Xinjiang. However, while many Uighurs are unhappy with Beijing’s controls, they manifest
their discontent through different means, from deep personal immersion into Islamic traditions to
advocating independence through violent methods . . . Uighur separatists have committed occasional acts of
violence in recent years, and a few have been linked to terrorist groups . . . In August 2002, the U.S.
government designated the East Turkestan Islamic Movement as a foreign organization that supports
terrorism and placed this obscure Xinjiang separatist group under an executive order blocking its financial
transactions and freezing its assets in the United States.76

This report, which was issued four months after the decision to designate the ETIM as a terrorist
organization, works to reconcile this designation with the conflicting frame of the Uyghur as
victims of the war on terror, and not actual terrorists. Here, “critics” are assigned the
humanitarian voice of dissent. Nevertheless, the structural indicator “however” separates the
opinions of critics from the view of this document, which more directly advocates a viewpoint in
which some Uyghur do “manifest their discontent through different means,” including “violent
methods.” Furthermore, this statement directly links Uyghur separatists to terrorists groups,
before giving a specific example of a group linked to terrorism: the ETIM. This particular
framing of the Uyghur as an oppressed group with terrorist tendencies, as evidenced by multiple
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references to the ETIM, can be traced throughout the period following 9/11 and up to the present.
Unlike the previous three frames, this association between the Uyghur and terrorism accounts for
U.S. policy decisions to designate the ETIM as a terrorist organization and imprison Uyghur in
Guantanamo Bay. This final narrative frame also directly contradicts official U.S. statements that
dismiss China’s accusations of Uyghur terrorism.

Conclusion and future prospects
The existence of these three competing frames is indicative of conflicting beliefs about the
Uyghur within the U.S. government over time, and points to the critical importance of tracking
the multiple discourses created and perpetuated after 9/11. Although many scholars, in their
examination of the war on terror and repression of the Uyghur, either assign the U.S. the role of
the willing partner in China’s campaign to crackdown on Xinjiang, or the voice of dissent, it is
clear from a thorough examination of these official statements that the U.S. narrative cannot be
reduced into either binary view. First, prior to 9/11 the U.S. projected the “Uyghur as victim”
frame, in which China was strongly criticized for human rights violations toward the Uyghur in
Xinjiang. In the months following 9/11, this narrative did not change much, but instead was
extended to include U.S. official condemnation of China’s leveraging of the war on terror to
justify the harsh repression of the Uyghur. The U.S. decision to not immediately adopt China’s
“Uyghur as terrorist” frame can be attributed to the fact that the U.S., prior to 9/11, consistently
interpreted the Uyghur as human rights victims. Therefore our government did not suddenly and
wholesale adopt a new frame that directly contradicted the prior narrative. However, as time
progressed, a third and fourth frame appeared in U.S. official documents. These frames look less
favorably upon the Uyghur, and are more supportive of China’s actions in Xinjiang. Not only did
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time affect the language of political discourse about the Uyghur, but the existence of multiple
state entities also contributed to the projection of multiple frames. For example, the CECC, as a
committee tasked with monitoring “human rights and the development of the rule of law in
China,” tends to publish documents that call for more rights for this minority group.77 On the
other hand, global terrorism reports published by the State Department directly refer to Uyghur
terrorism. Therefore, though many agree that China leverages the war on terror to kill two birds
with one stone by improving its international legitimacy and consolidating power over a
historically problematic ethnic minority, a complete analysis of the Uyghur issue requires an
examination of the multiple frames the U.S. projected in response to China’s own “war on
terror.” Furthermore, an analysis of these four frames supports the idea that 9/11 changed the
discourse around not only the Uyghur, but also other Muslim communities around the world.
Although many criticize the harsh persecution of Muslim minorities, others frame these groups
as terrorists. It is clear that U.S. is not immune to this international trend, as evidenced by the
shifting discourse on the Uyghur in official statements. What is still unclear is the extent to
which the U.S. will cooperate in China’s “war” against Uyghur terrorism, and any corresponding
and possibly new frames which both China and the U.S. have yet to project onto the Uyghur
issue in Xinjiang.
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